The Use of an Expression
Commenting on Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games in human practice, long-time associate Norman Malcom asserts, “the use of an expression is the language game in which it plays a part” (Malcom, 337)
Being only exposed in a limited way to the philosophy of The Witt, I wonder if the above quote could/should be reversed: “the use of an expression is the part it plays in a given language-game.”
Or, are these two word-orders closer in meaning than one might at first suppose?
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~ Norman Malcom, “Wittgenstein” in P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy VIII, 337.
April 12, 2008 at 7:25 p
Elaborate on that idea, Austin. Because an expression does shape what the language game–the expression, in some sense, creates that language game. But that can also be seen only in tangent with the idea that one properly grasp the idea they are working with a language game.
April 13, 2008 at 5:50 p
I don’t think that the quote can be reversed and mean the same thing. The use (not the expression itself) is the language game. Use isn’t a part of the game, it is the game. The expression is the component part.
April 13, 2008 at 5:50 p
On second thought, “reversed” might not be the best word for what you did to the original quotation. “Reorganized” would be better.
April 13, 2008 at 9:15 p
I agree with Dan. The Witt’s notion of “forms of life” is what he claims is the “given” in a language game. Therefore, the use (i.e. the action within a particular socio-historical context) is the game itself. This is why Witt escapes the confines of idealism – language is not a barrier to reality.
April 14, 2008 at 9:15 p
Perhaps it isn’t a barrier to reality, but Wittgenstein is also quite adament that language itself does not contain reality. Language is an artificial, and strictly functional, construct. Thus, while not blocking us from reality, language also does not lead us to reality.
Of course, all of this depends on what one means by “reality.” If “reality” is simply a compilation of statements like “the person typing this sentence is 5′10″ tall” then language can offer us a workable model of this reality (and, do note, the key thing here is the active sense of how language works). However, if “reality” also contains statements like “the person typing this sentence is virtuous” then language has drifted into the nonsensical, which is very close to, but not equal to, the unspeakable (here I am thinking of two statements made by Wittgenstein, the first is the 7th thesis of the Tratatus and the second is a comment from much later, found in Culture and Value: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” and “Don’t for heaven’s sake, be afraid of talking nonsense. But you must pay attention to your nonsense”.
Here it is important to remember Wittgenstein’s distinction between the factual and the real (or, perhaps, the metaphysical). While language may provide us with working models of facts, it does not provide us with anything close to the whole of reality. Indeed, even the relationship of language to facts is a rather pragmatic one. Hence, another quotation from Culture and Value: “The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe the fact which corresponds to it (is the translation of) a sentence, without simply repeating the sentence.”