Observation of the sense-organs and their employment reveals a distinction between the impassibility of the sensitive and that of the faculty of thought. After strong stimulation of a sense we are less able to exercise it than before, as e.g. in the case of a loud sound we cannot hear easily immediately after, or in the case of a bright colour or a powerful odour we cannot see or smell, but in the case of thought thinking about an object that is highly thinkable renders it more and not less able afterwards to think objects that are less thinkable: the reason is that while the faculty of sensation is dependent upon the body, thought is separable from it.
– Aristotle, On the Soul Book III
I understand the deductive logic at work here, but it seems clear to me that a simple rejection of the premises that “mental exhaustion in the face of much abstract thinking is impossible” is quite an easy jump to make. However, perhaps Aristotle had something else in mind regarding thoughts that are “highly thinkable.” After all, what, in the realm of thought, would correspond to a bright light or a sound at a high decibel level? The latter appear to have their noted deleterious effect byoverpowering the sense-faculty, whereas the only form of the argument which makes sense for Aristotle is one that claims that such a “highly thinkable” object renders the faculty of thought stronger by virtue of its rational simplicity or clarity. But then it what sense can the highly thinkable be considered analogous to the highly see-able or highly taste-able? Basically, it can’t, and that’s why this argument makes no sense to me. Any clues?
Anonymous said:
If we left Aristotle’s logic out of it, could those things be considered analogous? I’m trying to discern if your main issue with the argument is based on Aristotle’s logic, or if your problem is the issue of “highly thinkable” and “highly see-able” etc. being so easily comparable…
Troy said:
Yes, from my view they are in no way comparable.
msweetman said:
The comparison between something that is highly thinkable and highly see-able is not that they are both “overpowering”; it’s that they are both simple and immediately perceptible.
One can immediately discern a loud sound or a bright light, and he can immediately evaluate the equation “1+1”. “1+1” is a highly thinkable equation. “1+2” is a less thinkable equation, but it is easier to think once one understands “1+1”.
The argument is BS because it compares and action which dulls the senses to an action which sensitizes one’s thoughts. If someone practices his sense of taste, he develops a more sensitive palate. If he practices math, this thoughts are more sensitive to math.
If one assaults his ears with loud noises, he goes deaf. If he assaults his brain with bullshit, he becomes a sophomoric idiot, and he can’t think anything for himself. That’s the part of the premise that’s wrong; the analog of an assault on the senses is filling one’s mind with bullshit, not thinking highly thinkable thoughts.
Troy said:
Exactly, “damaging amounts of light” or “damaging amounts of sound” are in no way analogous to “damaging quality of thought.” If anything, this counts as proof against Aristotle’s notion that the intellect is therefore separable from the body – filling your mind with fluff will clearly damage it’s ability to function effectively, so it clearly isn’t!
Anonymous said:
Ah…yes. In terms of both of the above comments…it seems to me as you are, in fact, having to teach all sorts of BS. Welcome to education! Hopefully you’ll be moving on to saner figures soon.