Tags
Anselm, Aristotle, hylomorphism, Kant, ontological argument, Plato
I spent some time discussing Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of god earlier today, and something struck me. It’s neither all that profound nor original (probably), but I found it a good way to tie in the influence of ancient metaphysics to Anselm’s thinking. Put it this way: Anselm, in order to think it rational to believe that something that exists in the mind (i.e. that than which nothing greater can be conceived) can, in some sense, necessarily exist solely based on its conceptual structure must assume some variation of an “essence-precedes existence” logical paradigm, whereas if “existence-precedes-essence”, then it would be impossible to move from a single entity to its conceptual necessity. Now, where would this presupposition come from for Anselm?
In Anselm’s time, Johannes Scotus Eruigena had recently been the one to re-discover a number of Neo-Platonic texts and translate them into Latin, so there’s a sense in which this stuff is in the air. I mentioned to my student that it is possible to frame this debate as one between the battling traditions of Plato and Aristotle’s metaphysics:
Plato: Forms are primary to particular things, and it is therefore possible to think of a thing existing in the mind but not in reality (and therefore possible to assume that a conceptual structure itself can necessitate existence). The Form of something exists eternally, so it doesn’t matter if it ever actually exists in the world – it’s still rational. Existence is a predicate of the Form.
Aristotle: Particular things are primary to their forms (or “form inheres in matter”), and it is therefore impossible to think of a thing existing in the mind but not in reality (and therefore impossible to assume that a conceptual structure itself can necessitate existence). The form of something inheres in “the stuff”, so the thing must actually exist for its form to be intelligible. Existence is the pre-condition of the form.
I think this layout helps us understand the root of the issue. If you side with the Platonic tradition and affirm that the Forms exist eternally without regard for actual existence (essentially affirming some type of metaphysical immutability), then existence can be conceived as a predicate and the ontological argument makes perfect sense; however, if you align yourself with the Aristotelian tradition in affirming that the form of something inheres in matter, then you agree with a variation of the Kantian critique of Anselm: existence is not a predicate alongside others, it is their pre-condition.
It is also interesting to note that Aquinas the Aristotelian rejects the ontological argument as logically fallacious.
(Note: I understand that this is a rough generalization of Plato and Aristotle, and that its not entirely helpful to lump the Neo-Platonists in with the former or Kant with the latter, but as a broad schematic of options available, I think it works in illuminating the inherent difficulty in the ontological argument.)
Austin said:
there’s an interesting way to read the ontological argument as not only metaphysical but also ethical. that is, after the cartesian and kantian projects, thought and existence are not severed entirely as they both inhere within the transcendental ego. thus, the ontological argument might not merely be an assertion of possible existence ‘out there’ but rather a ‘subjective’ performative that posits a common bond between subjectivities.
that said, it’s interesting to note that this very argument for god’s existence is also the one that might lead to its greatest foe: the modern project, as such a turn inward negates the pure distinction between subject and object, thought and reality, human and divine. it’s almost as though nietzsche’s insight about ‘modern’ man killing god took place 800 years prior in anselm.
Troy said:
Yes, bringing out the subjective or “performative” aspect of the argument is a really interesting move (I mean, they’re monks, going “outside” in general is shunned). Barth does a similar thing in his Fides Quaerens Intellectum by arguing that Anselm’s project is a form of worship or other Christian-y practices, and that treating it as speculative philosophizing is an anachronism. I think it’s actually an almost ingenious exegetical move, but I just don’t care enough about the issue to track with that far (i.e. Anselm’s not quite hot enough to be the damsel in distress).
Jesse Roach said:
I’ve never thought about the ontological argument in light of the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle. I also never knew Aquinas rejected the argument.
Have you heard of the Modal Ontological Argument from Alvin Plantinga?
Troy said:
Yeah, I’ve heard of Plantinga’s modal version. I’m not sure I buy the “possibly P, therefore necessarily possibly P, therefore necessarily P” part of the argument, but I can’t say that I’m all that versed in modal logic. What little I do know, however, is that most logicians would say that the only sense in which a truth is “necessary” is if its negation involves a contradiction, and I’m not sure Plantinga gets there. I would also say that assuming that “maximal greatness” entails existence in every possible world is still predicating existence as if it were a property, and that falls into Kant’s critique as well.