The true philosophic contemplation, on the contrary, finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects contemplated, and thereby the subject contemplating. Everything, in contemplation, that is personal or private, everything that depends upon habit, self-interest, or desire, distorts the object, and hence impairs the union which the intellect seeks. By thus making a barrier between subject and object, such personal and private things become a prison to the intellect.
– Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy
Umm, I hate to be that guy, but doesn’t Russell’s critique of Kant sound a little like, I don’t know, Speculation, and in the Hegelian sense no less? I know he’s coming from the vantage point of a defense of the correspondence theory of truth (the previous chapter of TPOP), but it’s interesting to see how the two historically opposed schools might find a common ground in the critique of correlationism.