Pictures Always Lie: Akira Kurosawa’s Rashomon

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The Unseen Spectator: Cinematic Truth (and Lies) in Akira Kurosawa’s Rashomon

Cinema is not an art, not a technique. It is a mystery.

-Jean-Luc Godard

Histoire(s) du cinéma

It is very hard to think of Japanese cinema without first thinking of Kurosawa.  Following that, it is virtually impossible to not first consider Rashomon among his legacy of films.  Possibly Kurosawa’s most critically acclaimed picture, Rashomon’s texture is as enticing as it is abrasive: devious play of light and shadow, lust and barbarity mixed with murder and betrayal.  All this mayhem wound around three perplexed men who sit under the dilapidated ruins of a massive gate wondering what on earth it all means.  The film’s visuals are gorgeous and dense, making entire scenes appear as still life photos. Yet somehow the plot remains unnerving and elusive.  Like the three men just trying to get out of the rain, the audience is confronted with the confounding inability to make sense of the whole sordid mess.  As popular American cartoon characters Marge and Homer Simpson once quipped, Marge: Come on, Homer. Japan will be fun! You liked Rashomon.  Homer: That’s not how I remember it![i]

This very principle, often called the Rashomon effect, rings true even with those unfamiliar with the film.  Later American movies such as To Kill a Mockingbird, Anatomy of a Murder and 12 Angry Men would expose the capricious nature of justice but none would question the idea of truth with the same uncompromising depth as Rashomon.  Its uniqueness dealt with the core of human doubt not just by questioning man’s frailty but also by illustrating the monstrous nature of the truth itself.  Kurosawa’s most daring move was showing that reality becomes a ticklish business when no one seems reliable, not even the camera.

Rashomon in the Post-War World 

The film’s release brought critical appraise to Kurosawa’s name winning him a coveted golden lion at the Venice Film Festival.  More significant perhaps was the fact that the success of Rashomon garnered international recognition of the Japanese film industry.  In Hollywood, the film received exceptional attention, partially because it seemed to validate the new Japan, still under American occupation.

For them (Americans) Rashomon is a Japanese postwar film, thus its excellence must be due to the supervision and assistance supplied by the American occupiers.  Nearly all the American reviews stressed the strong Hollywood influence in the postwar period and that the Japanese public has been spoiled by the polish of American movies which their native pictures cannot easily approach.(Harrington)

Despite the fact that Rashomon won the Oscar for best foreign film, there was an urgent need to explain how Japan had “suddenly” become relevant in the world of cinema.  In truth, this suddenness was entirely untrue as Japan already had developed a significant film industry many years prior to the war but comparatively few Japanese films had been screened overseas.  Japanese culture was typically seen as archaic and provincial making it all the more unaccountable that Japan, the decided loser in the war, would create a film that rivaled the best Hollywood had to offer.  It was assumed by default that the success must have been due to the guidance of western democracy.  This wayward critical response revealed an interesting aspect of the film, one often overshadowed by its visual complexity: alienation and distrust in a war-torn country.  In seeking an explanation for Rashomon’s creative brilliance, most American reviews had unknowingly touched on an unpleasant truth of the lives of the Japanese people.  This had, albeit inadvertently, shown America’s role as the unseen judge in the wake of post-war Japan. To quote fictional sleuth Hercule Poirot, “Now you have accidentally said something valuable![ii]

Evidence of this can be seen in the all of the courtyard scenes wherein the witnesses face the camera.  The faces of the members of the court are never shown and their questions go unheard by the audience.  The silent gaze of the judge and jury peer down upon the witnesses as the accounts unfold without any clear indication of the magistrate’s ruminations on the case.  Even at the end of the film the verdict is left uncertain, just as much as Japan’s own future was unforeseeable after the collapse of the empire.  It is crucial to note that when Rashomon was released open discussion of the old regime and, in particular, the atomic bomb was strictly censored.

Interestingly, this privation of discourse forced the film to take a necessarily figurative approach.  Although Kurosawa would later go on to approach the subject directly in the spellbinding tale of paranoiac industrialist Kiichi Nakajima (Toshiro Mifune) in the 1955 film I Live in Fear, the absence of direct confrontation speaks to the mentality of postwar Japan.  More than looking at the immediate consequences of the war and the catastrophic losses of the bomb, Rashomon questioned the temerity of the human soul and whether or not any good could come from man.  Although rarely looked at as a traditional jidaigeki (period drama) the film’s setting, situated at the end of the Heian period, was by no means coincidental.  The ruination of the Heian period is remarkably similar to the disastrous aftermath of the post-war era.  In both scenarios Japan had experienced a culmination of advancements, both culturally and scientifically, followed by an eruption of war and violence.

Even before I Live in Fear, one could make the case that Kurosawa dealt with the bomb, or at least its legacy, in allegorical form. Consider Rashomon, with its vision of a ruined gate at which sit three perplexed men.  Physical ruin and metaphysical doubt, the major pictorial and thematic characteristics of the film, made Rashomon a timely allegory of Japan’s ignominious defeat and a universal philosophical examination of the new world order wrought by the bomb.(Dresser)

Fittingly enough, if any people were more surprised than then Americans by the film’s success it was most certainly the Japanese themselves.  The unprecedented fact of the film’s international commendation illustrated all too well that Japan was in the midst of turbulent and rapid change.  Ironically, it wasn’t the purported “western,” qualities that caused many Japanese critics to dismiss the success of the film.  Rather, many asserted that the western affinity for stereotypical Japanese period pieces, complete with swords and samurai, must have been the only logical reason for the film’s international appeal. Kurosawa himself bemoaned the recalcitrant disapproval from his fellow countrymen.

Japanese critics insisted that these two prizes (the golden lion and academy award) were simply reflections of Westerners’ curiosity and taste for Oriental exoticism, which struck me then, and now, as terrible. Why is it that Japanese people have no confidence in the worth of Japan? Why do they elevate everything foreign and denigrate everything Japanese? Even the woodblock prints of Utamaro, Hokusai and Sharaku were not appreciated by Japanese until they were first discovered by the West. I don’t know how to explain this lack of discernment. I can only despair of the character of my own people.(Kurosawa)

Amusingly enough, Daiei Studios president Masaichi Nagata had expressed grave concern over the film during its production, worried that its antiquated backdrop would put off westerners and tarnish the image of a bold new Japan.  However, even above the apprehension over the film’s setting was the unconventional and perplexing script.  Regardless of the production team’s familiarity with the original material, an adaptation of two Ryunosuke Akutagawa short stories, the vexing plot was the source of much contention even as shooting began.  In his autobiography, Kurosawa recalls the discrepancy vividly:

One day just before the shooting was to start, the three assistant directors Daiei had assigned me came to see me at the inn where I was staying. I wondered what the problem could be. It turned out that they found the script baffling and wanted me to explain it to them. “Please read it again more carefully,” I told them. “If you read it diligently, you should be able to understand it because it was written with the intention of being comprehensible.(Kurosawa)

Considering the sizable challenges of creating a period piece in a country that was just emerging out of its ravaged wartime state, it is an impressive feat that Rashomon was ever filmed in the first place.  However, it was precisely the scandalous nature of the story that would reverberate throughout the international world of cinema, like a belated aftershock of the atomic bomb that had devastated Japan only five years earlier.  At the time of its release it was apparent that both the U.S. and Japan had not fully understood the philosophical and psychological chasm that was created from World War II.  The spectacle and intensity of Rashomon would bring about a sobering reminder of the world that was left to the survivors.  Whether victorious or conquered, mankind had just experienced the bloodiest and most costly conflict in its history.  The question remained whether or not humanity was an entity worth having faith in any longer.  As the Commoner from Kurosawa’s tale said, “In the end you cannot understand the things men do.”

 What Happened?

Perhaps the most curious quality of the film is the fact that, even after multiple viewings, the testimonies of the central figures are equally irreconcilable.  Despite conflicting one another, no one testimony benefits one party while condemning their accusers.  The experience of each character is so starkly different that it becomes apparent to the audience that they value the “truth” of their own accounts at the expense of their innocence.  Dismissing the deceased Husband’s testimony, for those disinclined to listen to mediums, there appears to be nothing to gain from taking one piece of testimony over the other.

The Husband’s story speaks in condemnation of his wife’s actions. He openly decries her for succumbing to Tajomaru’s advances.  Along with his pitiless accusations, he even pardons the rape of his wife after Tajomaru leaves the final decision of her fate up to him.  Misogynistic attitudes aside, what could the deceased Husband possibly gain by excusing the rape of his wife and committing suicide?  Of course, the film implies that mankind’s selfishness extends beyond death even when no material satisfaction can be acquired, but for the audience, and the magistrate for that matter, the testimony seems utterly incomprehensible. In terms of rationale, the Woman’s tale does not fair much better.  While she does not actually confess to murdering her husband she implicates herself as the responsible party by having a suspicious lapse in memory by taking up her dagger, the alleged murder weapon, after Tajomaru flees.  She too, does not stand to benefit in any capacity by lying about “suddenly awaking to find the dagger buried in her husband’s chest.”  So, why should she fabricate such a bizarre tale?  Tajomaru’s testimony is easily the most perplexing.  He has no qualm about admitting to the murder of the Husband, even though the husband’s story directly contradicts this assertion.  In fact his only real concern seems to be defending his reaction to the Woman after sexually assaulting her.  Curiously, he denies neither the acts of murder nor rape and only seems uncertain when it comes to the dagger.  In fact, the one coherent, unifying piece of testimony among the three is the uncertainty of what happened to the dagger after the murder.  Only the Woodcutter’s final version suggests what happened and this arises after he condemns the Commoner for stealing from a hapless infant.  Ignoring the dénouement, attempting to piece together a sensible report of the crime is ultimately an exercise in futility. Appropriately enough, this is exactly the effect that Kurosawa sought to establish:

Human beings are unable to be honest with themselves about themselves. They cannot talk about themselves without embellishing. This script portrays such human beings—the kind who cannot survive without lies to make them feel they are better people than they really are.  Egoism is a sin the human being carries with him from birth; it is the most difficult to redeem.(Kurosawa)

Even if none of the characters’ testimonies are reliable, which the end of the film seems to suggest, their own self-delusion prevents them from retracting their accounts.  Furthermore, the resolution of the film doesn’t answer the whodunit and leaves the audience uttering the same opening line as the Woodcutter, “I don’t understand it at all.” Author and NYU Professor of East Asian Studies, Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, further explains this idea:

The film does not include any clearly marked details that enable us to determine the truth value of their stories.  This kind of criticism misses the point of the film’s narration, since what is foregrounded in Rashomon is not the question of the characters’ reliability as narrators but the question of the reliability of narration in image…by not constructing any complex logical scheme underlying the testimonies of the defendants and witnesses, Kurosawa foregrounds the fundamental affirmativeness of narration in film image.(Yoshimoto)

Again, Kurosawa’s message becomes lucid only by recognizing the incomprehensibility of ascertaining the truth.  By not showing “what really happened,” Kurosawa clearly exposes the ambivalent nature of humanity.  The characters are thrown into the disorienting light and shadow of the forest and caught up amongst the hellish reality of their own self-delusion, desires, and lies.  In turn, the audience is caught up in the confusion and chaos of their stories, totally unable to decipher the truth behind it all.

What does it all mean?

 If Rashomon‘s message focuses on the inability to reconcile the actions of people in the midst of struggle and scandal, then what is the audience left with as a response?  Is the presentation of this fascinating, but nonetheless, disturbing story meant to confound the viewer or communicate some greater truth?  The difficulty in claiming what is true always becomes more complex when it is impossible to ascertain what is false.  Just as the silence of the magistrate is an obvious metaphor for the American censorship during the occupation, so the grove is a greater metaphor for the world: a dense maze fraught with contrasting shades of light and dark, confusion and clarity.

Instead of looking at the forest in the Shakespearean context of the so-called “green world” wherein fantastical things occur, one should recognize it as a brutal depiction of reality.  In turn, it is the court and its consistent visual clarity, always shot in medium-wide symmetrical balance, that is the fantasy world, the lie.  It is this very establishment of social order and moral justice that serves only as a stage from which the characters lie.  Again, the Commoner mentions this obvious fact when the Woodcutter protests the veracity of his final story, “No one lies after he says he’s going to do so.”

However, the film is not simply an exercise in cinematic misanthropy.  Indeed the radical claim of the narrative is the fact that our sense of “what is real” is ultimately determined by our own recollections, experiences, and reason-none of which is absolutely unquestionable.  Much like the biblical account of Job, the inability to find coherence or meaning behind the heinous actions of men is the truth of the matter.  In attempting to claim otherwise, we only produce greater falsehoods.  This, claims the character of the Priest, is no excuse to capitulate to barbarism; rather it is all the more reason to hope.  Are we, the audience, not placed in the same condition as those three figures getting out of the rain, unable to give a reason for such a horrible crime?  The first human reaction and most honest interpretation when faced with brutal confrontation with the truth is disbelief. If the truth is monstrous, better to not believe it and concoct a more approachable falsehood.

By saying ‘I can’t understand it’ we are captured by the film’s rhetorical effect, putting ourselves in the position of the woodcutter and the priest, the surrogates for the audience. Precisely by performing the role of the bewildered spectators, we correctly respond to the film without realizing it.(Yoshimoto)

Thus, it is the figure of the Woodcutter who, while acquiescing to his own failures and deceit, agrees to face the uncertainty of the world and take on the unnecessary burden of the child.  The movie’s resolution is a particularly sore spot for many critics who deride it for its shameless Disney-esque “happily ever after,” tone that seems so incongruous with the overall bleakness of the story.  But, this critique blatantly misses the overall point: what should cause the audience to think that, after everything they have seen, the child will grow up to be anything different than the bandit Tajomaru, the doubting Priest, or the misanthropic Commoner?

The Woodcutter surely holds no such delusions concerning the “sinless” nature of the abandoned child.  Rather he asserts that it was the parents who made the sacrifice by placing the amulet next to the child.  This, admittedly irrational and desperate act, places trust in strangers, in some unknown other.  In spite of the hopelessness of the world, the parents trust that someone would recognize that the amulet was left to protect the child from the harsh realities of the world.  The Woodcutter believes this, despite all evidence that the parents had committed the reprehensible act of forsaking their own child.  Instead of stating this obvious fact, he boldly asserts that even though the parents failed to care for their infant they still held the hope that someone else would not be so feeble.  It is this action that causes the doubting Priest to state, “Thanks to you, I think I can keep my faith in man.”

In a time when Japan was most uncertain about its future and in dire need of philosophical direction, the most honest assessment was to resist any facile attempt to rationalize or justify the ruinous state of the world.  Rather than attempting to paint the horrors of war in a romantic vignette of national solidarity or assimilate western cultural values, Rashomon gives a much more powerful answer.  We must recognize the futility of such endeavors and move on in spite of the emptiness of man and the meaninglessness of human suffering.

 

 

Bibliography

Dresser, David M. “Japan: An Ambivalent Nation, an Ambivalent Cinema.” Swords and Ploughshares IX (1995): 16-17.

Harrington, Curtis. “Rashomon and the Japanese Cinema.” Akira Kurosawa, Donald Richie. Rutgers Films in Print: Rashomon. Ed. Ryusunosuke Akutagawa Donald Richie. Trans. Rysunosuke Akutagawa. Illustrated, re-print. Vol. VI. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987. 141-142.

Kurosawa, Akira. Something like an autobiography . Trans. Audie E. Bock. 1st Edition. New York: Vintage Books, 1983. 130-139.

Murder on the Orient Express. By Agatha Christie Paul Dehn. Dir. Sidney Lumet. Perf. Albert Finney. Prod. Richard B. Goodwin John Brabourne. Paramount Pictures, 1974.

Yoshimoto, Mitsushiro. Kurosawa: film studies and Japanese cinema. Ed. Harry Hraootunian, Masao Miyoshi Rey Chow. 1st Edition. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000. 185-189.


[i] Taken from the episode “Thirty Minutes Over Tokyo” from the show’s tenth season

[ii] From the 1974 film adaptation of Agatha Christie’s Murder on the Orient Express

The Binaries of Capitalist Relations

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Over the weekend there was a bit of a debate in the lefty-politico blogosphere concerning whether or not CEOs and other lavishly payed individuals can be accurately labeled as “workers” without obscuring something about their connection to capital. Matt Yglesias started it by arguing that according to the classical Marxist conception, CEOs are technically wage slaves, and Doug Henwood and Peter Frase countered it respectively. It was Frase’s post, however, that I found most interesting since he dealt with some of the underlying issues of political economy that Yglesias’s post neglected. In short, it’s not so much that the means of production have been taken away from the fat-cats and given to shareholders in a sort of compromise with the worker’s movements of the 20th century, but that the binary relationship between capital and labor remains unchanged even while the exploitative relationship between bourgeois and proletarian remains.

It is possible, at least in principle, to have a society that is just as capitalist as ours, but where everyone is really a “worker” in a meaningful sense… the opposition between capital and labor is not the same as the opposition between capitalists and workers, and you can’t always cleanly align the two relations on top of each other.

The point is that the capital/labor split is the fundamental one – it is the transcendental set of categories. The back and forth negotiations between actually-existing capitalists and workers doesn’t have to perfectly co-align with the form in which capital affects labor, or the fact that people are still forced to sell their labor-power for sustenance. The only difference between the Marxist conception and our current setting is found in the relationships among the actors of capital, and not in the capital/labor network itself.

What’s most interesting about this is in how the changes in the bourgeois/proletarian relations can be seen to shed light on the possibilities of change in the transcendental category of capital/labor. Marx once remarked how the fact that the capitalists might be willing to sell stock in their company to outside interests proved once and for all that ownership of the means of production by the hands-on entrepreneurial capitalist was not a fundamental truth of modernity: if this is possible, then why not allow the workers, who are just as incentivized to grow their business and profit as much as stockholders but also happen to be hands-on and knowledgeable about the industry in which they work, to in a sense “hold the stock”? It’s the best of both worlds: the knowledge and aptitude of the entrepreneur with the incentive of the stockholder, just without the bourgeoisie.

Marx and The Great Moderation

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Much has been said about how The Great Moderation of the 80s onward was a sufficient refutation of the Marxist doctrine of unavoidable crisis, and even more has been said about how the financial and housing crises of 2008 were a sufficient confirmation of Marxist interpretations of the internal contradictions of capitalism, but having just recently reread the Manifesto for the first time since I was a freshman in college, I want to posit the hypothetical possibility that Marx foresaw the “band-aid” capitalism of late 20th century neoliberalism, and that he understood that the power of the middle-class would need to be sutured to the false prosperity of things like housing bubbles, minimum wage increases, and the steady inflation needed to reduce debt obligations in order to avoid systemic crises.

It might even be argued that the entire neoliberal project was an attempt to foreclose the immediacy of these crises, pushing them back further and further until the inevitable return of the repressed forcefully reared its ugly head (with the Keynesian hope being that this process might be forever forestalled). In other words, systemic crises as a natural byproduct of capital growth never went away, but were only postponed – and this project was ostensibly produced by and for the middle-class. After all, it is a generally accepted point that the predicted Marxist revolution in industrial America was answered with the rise of this very middle-class, the hedge between the class antagonisms of the bourgeois and proletarian wage-labor. Here’s a passage from the Manifesto:

The lower middle-class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle-class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat…

This “fight against the bourgeoisie” by the middle-class simply transferred its political power from a romanticized desire for the return of guilds, lords, and the Medieval aesthetic to the construction of a majority-based middle-class – suburbs, petty culture and all. The fact that this culture is utterly dominant as a factor of population is clearly what has prevented any sort of Marxist revolution among the now less representative working class. It’s just a small step from the romantic petit bourgeoisie of the passage previously cited to the petty, but now powerful (in theory), middle-class based band-aid capitalism of the allegedly “post-crisis” era of capitalism.

It’s almost like dealing with an angry, abusive husband: he’s semi-predictable, so you can build a routine around his outbursts, and even learn to negotiate and bargain with him, albeit in an ultimately irrational language of his own creation. Unfortunately, it’s inevitable that he’s going to have an outburst at some point that you cannot predict, that cannot be managed. Technocratic capitalism isn’t the closed system of economics everyone wishes it was, just as the claim that the abusive husband “isn’t really evil on the inside” is an incredibly hollow charge assuming a level of interiorty only matched by the model-based idealism of the efficient markets hypothesis and the like. The only sane solution then is separation and divorce.

The Fear of the Lord is the Beginning of Wisdom

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Hegel makes use of this phrase in the “Lordship and Bondage” chapter of the Phenomenology in a way that I found very interesting, in that it is not at all in the Solomonic parlance. The “fear” here is not reverence or humility, but the absolute fear that confronts a consciousness in the figure of the master, a fear that forces it to “melt to its inmost soul.” Without this labor of the negative, consciousness can never be truly “for itself.” Likewise, the lord mentioned here is not a deity figure, but the other of the master. And lastly, the beginning of wisdom is not the practical moral knowledge of the proverbs, but the only sense in which a consciousness can attain the knowledge that it exists objectively, in and for itself (an und fur sich). This phrase is actually quite a nice summary of the maser/slave dialectic as a whole. Pithy.

A Quote To Start My Day of Research

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No one should postpone the study of philosophy when he is young, nor should he weary of it when he becomes mature, because the search for mental health is never untimely or out of season. To say that the time to study philosophy has not yet arrived or that it is past is like saying that the time for happiness is not yet at hand or is no longer present. Thus both the young and the mature should pursue philosophy, the latter in order to be rejuvenated as they age by the blessings that accrue from pleasurable past experience, and the youthful in order to become mature immediately through having no fear of the future. Hence we should make a practice of the things that make for happiness, for assuredly  when we have this we have everything, and we do everything we can to get it when we don’t have it.

~ Epicurus, ‘Letter to Menoeceus’

100% Synthetic A Priori

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Kant, from the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics:

One might well at first think: that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a purely analytic proposition that follows from the concept of a sum of seven and five according to the principle of contradiction. However, upon closer inspection, one finds that the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing further than the unification of the two numbers into one, through which by no means is thought what this single number may be that combines the two. The concept of twelve is in no way already thought because I merely think to myself this unification of seven and five, and I may analyze my concept of such a possible sum for as long as may be, still I will not meet with twelve therein. One must go beyond these concepts, in making use of the intuition that corresponds to one of the two, such as one’s five fingers, or (like Segner in his arithmetic) five points, and in that manner adding the units of the five given in intuition step by step to the concept of seven. One therefore truly amplifies one’s concept through this proposition 7 + 5 = 12 and adds to the first concept a new one that was not thought in it; that is, an arithmetical proposition is always synthetic, which can be seen all the more plainly in the case of somewhat larger numbers, for it is then clearly evident that, though we may turn and twist our concept as we like, we could never find the sum through the mere analysis of our concepts, without making use of intuition.

What exactly was Kant responding to – the idea that mathematical principles were analytic a priori judgments? Of course not, he was answering math atheism!

Ultra-Cynical Randianism

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Thesis: the rhetoric surrounding the potential for a “strike of the upper class” by Fox News anchors and Objectivists of various stripes, assumed to be a threat of impending doom upon the smooth functioning of the global economy and the continuance of “our jobs”, is actually an ultra-cynical attempt to frighten the vanguard of the Left from achieving its stated goal (full worker control of the means of production) by actually threatening the absolute horror of being face-to-face with its fundamental fantasy, an introduction of a psychological virus at the level of each individual which would ultimately break the Left’s collective will.

They’re not saying “if we leave, everything will spin out of control.” Instead, they’re saying “you want to escape hell? Fine, there’s the door…”, and we cower.

Discuss.

Existential Marxism: A Clarification

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I believe that one of the consistent misunderstandings of Sartre’s ‘Existential Marxism’ as laid out in CDR is that somehow Sartre was seeking to ‘existentialize’ Marxist theory. This thought is common among readers of CDR who, I believe, have read roughshod over this text and/or tried too hard to retrofit CDR into Sartre’s existentialist oeuvre. While Sartre clearly does intend to dialectically tether these two seemingly disparate tendencies together, he takes a unique course in doing so.

Rather than simply trying to utilize the early Marx and rather than simply trying to supplement what is commonly understood as Marxist analysis with his existentialist notions, what Sartre is doing is something much more grandiose. He is seeking to enrich what might be called a ‘Marxist paradigm’ with existentialist concerns. What this means is that Sartre is not seeking to ‘existentialize’ Marxism per se, but is rather working within a historico-philosophical paradigm that he describes as Marxist.

See, for Sartre there is a sharp distinction to be made between ‘philosophy’ and ‘ideology’. Whereas the former bears the characteristics of novelty and dominance, the latter is defined as working within the framework of philosophy. Philosophy is the schema in which ideology finds itself and to which ideology responds. By analogy, we could say that ideology is philosophy’s accident. As such, Sartre gives examples of a few ‘moments’ of philosophy: a ‘Descartes and Locke moment’, a ‘Kant and Hegel moment’, and a ‘Marx moment.’ The latter is the moment in which Sartre himself believed he resided (whether or not he was correct or whether we are still in the ‘Marx moment’ is a topic for another time…). Thus, any and all thinkers of a given period are unable to surpass this paradigm in which they find themselves – whether they realize this or not. This means that Kierkegaard, for Sartre, was not a philosopher, but an ideologist living in the moment of Hegel. And as an ideologist (a ‘good’ ideologist in Sartre’s mind), K was therefore necessarily only ever enriching the Hegelian paradigm. Likewise, Sartre saw himself and his contemporaries as living in, and enriching a Marxist paradigm (and I’m intentionally NOT using ‘Marxian’ to show a distinction between the work of Marx himself and the tradition of Marxist thought, as well as to highlight the even larger framework of the ‘Marxist moment’). This means that when Sartre talks about ‘Marxism’ embracing existentialism so that the former might ‘rediscover man in the social world’ he has in mind NOT Marxism as the tradition passed down through those concerned merely with Marxian ideas, as though he believed that Marx’s writings needed to be supplemented by a thorough reading of Being and Nothingness. Nor was he merely criticizing the Marxist thinkers of his day (the so called ‘economic determinists’). Rather, he meant that existentialism is crucial insofar as it would disrupt the dominant philosophical paradigm of the day, which he characterized as ‘Marxist.’ Now understanding what this ‘Marxist moment’ actually consisted of is a painstaking task that exceeds the grasp of a blog entry. But suffice it to say, in the least, that the ‘Marxist moment’ that Sartre had in mind was something much grander than just what is generally thought of when we use the label ‘Marxism’ – perhaps it is best described as an epoch… And as such, existentialism is not merely a supplement to Marx’s thought, nor was it intended by Sartre to be a response to Althusser (although this was a byproduct). Instead, it’s best to think of Sartre’s ‘Existential Marxism’ as an enriching of the dialectical moment in which he found himself; the situation in which he was determined to respond – the Marxist moment.

Therefore, when writers like Edouard Morot-Sir claim that ‘It is difficult to imagine the Marxist philosopher existentializing himself, and the reverse’ I can’t help but think there has been a serious oversight in the analysis. By bringing man into the social world, Sartre was NOT suggesting that the ‘Marxist’ existentialize himself. He was calling for an enriching thought that would flow in novel directions, emerging out of situations of exigence, situations that demanded new ways of thinking and living in the world.

Communism’s Second Death

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From Badiou, Philosophy and the Death of Communism:

That this death be a second death is attested by a remarkable fact of opinion, which is nevertheless real: the ‘death of communism’ is rhetorically deployed alongside the ‘break up of the Soviet Empire’. That ‘communism’ thus be tied to ’empire’ in the destiny of what is mortal proves – since subjectively ‘communism’ named the universal community, the end of class, and thus the contrary of all empire – that this ‘death’ is only the event-of-dying of what is already dead.